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Let us start with what I think is a surprising, but not widely recognised, fact about 
learning, namely that humans seem to be unable to think about learning without 
employing metaphors of some kind. Precisely why the use of metaphors is inescapable 
when we try to understand learning is a complex matter that is well beyond the scope of 
this paper. (For some suggestive ideas on this matter see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; 
Murdoch 1997. See also Hager 2004a). 
 
Let me remind you of what exactly a metaphor is. According to the Oxford Companion to 
English Literature, metaphor can be thought of as “the transfer of a name or descriptive 
term to an object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable, 
e.g. ‘abysmal ignorance’”. (The related notion of analogy is, of course, concerned with 
“likeness in certain respects”). Scheffler (1960, p. 48ff), in an early insightful discussion 
of the centrality of metaphorical language in educational writing, including writing about 
learning, noted that metaphors indicate 
 
that there is an important analogy between two things, without saying explicitly in 
what the analogy consists. Now, every two things are analogous in some respect, 
but not every such respect is important.... the notion of importance varies with the 
situation..... 
 
Scheffler added that every metaphor has limitations, “points at which the analogies it 
indicates break down” (1960, p. 48). For dominant metaphors, he suggested that we need 
to determine their limitations, thereby “opening up fresh possibilities of thought and 
action.” (Scheffler 1960, p. 49). The limitations that flow from employing metaphors, 
especially the respects in which the two things are not alike, is an important theme in 
what follows. 
 
The ‘common-sense’ understanding of learning: acquisition and transfer 
 
We can illustrate how thought about learning is immersed in metaphors by considering 
how learning is commonly understood. There is a widely accepted, ‘common-sense’ story 
about learning that goes something like the following (Hager 2005a). The most desirable 
learning is located in individual minds (not bodies); such learning centres on factual 
statements (or propositions) (true, false; more certain, less certain); these propositions are 
available for ready recall by the minds that have acquired them. So learning involves the 
furnishing of minds with appropriate arrays of propositions (knowledge). Once acquired, 
learning can be transferred (applied), via our bodies, to alter the external world.  
 
Bereiter (2002) dubs this ‘common-sense’ story the ‘folk theory’ of learning. It views the 
mind as a ‘container’ and ‘knowledge as a type of substance’ that is placed in the 
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container. Thus, it is widely accepted that learning is ‘adding more substance’ to the mind 
thought of as being a kind of container. 
Under the influence of the mind-as-container metaphor, knowledge is treated as 
consisting of objects contained in individual minds, something like the contents of 
mental filing cabinets.    (Bereiter 2002, p. 179) 
 
This ‘common-sense’ story involves several metaphors. The prime metaphor is the notion 
of acquisition, which is invariably accompanied by the associated metaphor of transfer. 
Thus, the acquisition and transfer metaphors dominate popular thinking about learning. 
This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given that formal education has been compulsory for well 
over a century, so that the public has been well and truly ‘schooled’ to accept that 
learning of propositional knowledge is the ‘natural’ kind of learning. Pen-and-paper or 
oral testing situations have been the ubiquitous means to find out what level of learning a 
student has attained (acquisition metaphor). If learning has been successful, the student 
will be able to reproduce it (transfer metaphor) in the test situation. 
 
The ‘common-sense’ story about learning probably underpins the public perception that 
successful performance in quiz shows is a good measure of learning. This perception of 
quiz show performance involves a series of associated assumptions, each of which can be 
related closely to the acquisition and transfer metaphors: 
• All questions have a correct answer. 
• The height of learning attainment is to be able to answer all questions. 
• The degree of learning can be accurately quantified (e.g., as % of correct 
answers). 
 
Now you might think that professional educators are much more sophisticated than this. 
We don’t really think that the mind is a container. Nor do we think that all questions have 
a single correct answer. Do we? But, I maintain, there are crucial elements of this 
‘common-sense’ story that continue to shape thinking about learning and assessment in 
educational systems and policy documents. Formal education systems have, of course, 
traditionally been closely aligned with the learning of propositional knowledge. 
Propositional learning has dominated curriculum at all levels to the extent that it has been 
regarded as the highest form of learning. Thus the general implication has been that able 
students should focus on traditional theoretical disciplines and that less able students 
should combine more elementary versions of these disciplines with the study of more 
practical and applied subjects. Likewise educational assessment has been dominated by a 
focus on assessing propositional learning, partly because reliance on the various kinds of 
pen-and-paper tests that cater most readily for assessing propositional learning is more 
economical than the alternatives. 
 
However, when I say that there are crucial elements of the ‘common-sense’ story that 
continue to dominate thinking about learning and assessment, I am thinking of even more 
fundamental assumptions about learning that we take over from this story. Assumptions 
such as ‘What is learnt is an independent thing or substance’. Since individual learners 
supposedly acquire and contain this thing or substance (i.e. learning), then ‘Learning is a 
kind of thing inside of learners’. Also, since learners can apply or transfer their learning, 
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another fundamental assumption is that ‘There is movement of this thing or substance 
(learning) from place to place’. So learning as a thing has a clear independence both of 
the learner and of the contexts in which it is acquired and applied. 
 
There is also a skill learning equivalent of the ‘common-sense’ story about learning. In 
many respects its assumptions parallel the furnishing of minds with statements (or 
propositions) story, but its distinctiveness lies in its focus is on skills instead of 
statements. Skills are viewed as things that somehow lodge in the learner’s body (or, 
better, psychomotor system). Once again, what is learnt is an independent thing or 
substance. This is captured in popular discourse about skills, e.g. ‘gaining skills’, 
‘passing skills on from one generation to the next’, ‘either use them or you lose them’. 
(The notion of disuse producing decay over time also applies, of course, to propositional 
learning). That skills are independent of the learner is suggested by the fact that different 
learners can all acquire the same skill. Skill learning, like theoretical learning, supposedly 
involves literal movement of the learnt thing or substance from place to place (e.g. 
transfer of a skill from worksite A to worksite B). Also, skills are thought of as separate 
from and independent of the context in which they are learned. The widespread 
acceptance of this assumption is evident from the current enthusiasm for generic skills. 
As nations have sought to respond to globalisation by enriching, expanding and better 
recognising the skills profiles of their labour force, policies to promote and reward so-
called ‘generic skills’, such as employability skills, key skills, and learning to learn skills 
have become common at all levels of education systems (see, e.g., Hager & Holland 
2006).  
 
Another example of the power of this story of skill learning and its associated metaphors 
is provided by what I call naïve competence policies. Much vocational education is 
premised on prescribed sets of competencies or skills that individuals need to acquire in 
training courses (see Hager 2004b). Having acquired them, individuals are certified as 
‘competent’, and go out and transfer or apply these competencies to any job within their 
occupational field. Naturally, employers have been very attracted by the notion of recruits 
who are fully productive from day one. Unfortunately, these high hopes have proved to 
be misplaced (Hager and Smith 2004) largely because, even in very standardised 
occupations, workplace competence requires significant contextual learning. 
 
The most basic kinds of performance assessment focus on testing individual skills along 
these lines (including instances in medical education). Centring testing on individuals 
seems right because of the assumption that learning is inside of the individual. With this 
assumption, group learning seems to be a possibility only in very limited senses. For 
instance a group of learners might all learn the same skill. In which case, we might say 
that the group possesses the particular skill. But this is a very limited sense of ‘group 
learning’. Employing the acquisition and transfer metaphors rules out the possibility of 
group learning except as a sum of what is inside of the respective individuals. If the 
assumption that learning is located inside the learner is dropped, richer notions of group 
learning become viable, as will be demonstrated later in the paper. 
 
Limitations of the acquisition and transfer metaphors 
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Problems arise from taking transfer and acquisition too literally as key notions to 
characterise learning. In fact, being metaphors, they have inevitable limitations. We will 
examine these briefly. 
 
Let us begin with problems surrounding the acquisition metaphor. In thought and talk 
about learning, acquisition though supposedly employed in its normal everyday sense, is 
actually used somewhat differently. We take it that when someone acquires and thereby 
possesses learning, that what they have learnt is inside of them (in their mind/brain for 
propositional learning; inside of their body for skill learning). But this is not normally so 
for acquisition and possession. We can acquire and possess such things as a car, a block 
of land, or a wine collection. But none of these possessions are thereby located inside of 
us. So why should acquisition and possession of knowledge or skills be any different? 
Certainly, recent work in neuroscience challenges the cosy, mutually supportive 
consistency that the ‘common-sense’ understanding of learning posits between the 
acquisition, possession and transfer metaphors and the idea that learning is located in the 
head. Bennett and Hacker (2003) illuminate the conceptual confusions that become 
apparent if the findings of neuroscience are placed against ‘common-sense’ accounts of 
minds and learning. For instance, Bennett and Hacker, point out that it is simply wrong to 
think that knowledge and information can be recorded in the brain in the same way that 
they can be recorded in books, card-indexes and computers. Regarding knowledge they 
state: 
 
We may say of a book that it contains all the knowledge of a lifetime’s work of a 
scholar, or of a filing cabinet that it contains all the available knowledge, duly 
card-indexed, about Julius Caesar. This means that the pages of the book or the 
cards in the filing cabinet have written on them expressions of a large number of 
known truths. In this sense, the brain contains no knowledge whatsoever. There 
are no symbols in the brain that by their array express a single proposition, let 
alone a proposition that is known to be true. Of course, in this sense a human being 
contains no knowledge either. To possess knowledge is not to contain knowledge.  
(Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 152-3) 
 
So even if learners do possess their learning, to think that they contain it is to read too 
much into the metaphors. Bennett and Hacker then argue that similar considerations 
apply to the notion that information can be recorded in the brain: 
 
A great deal of information is contained in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In that 
sense, there is none in the brain. Much information can be derived from a slice 
through a tree trunk or from a geological specimen – and so too from PET and 
fMRI scans of the brain’s activities. But this is not information that the brain has. 
Nor is it written in the brain, let alone in the ‘language of the brain’, any more than 
dendrochronological information about the severity of winters in the 1930s is 
written in the tree trunk in arboreal patois.   
(Bennett & Hacker 2003, pp. 153). 
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So the commonly accepted idea that in propositional learning propositions are transferred 
to the mind or brain is dubious. A fortiori, it is even more dubious to try to locate the 
many and diverse kinds of human learning within the cranium. 
 
There are also problems with the transfer metaphor. It proves on close inspection to 
involve puzzling oddities. In the normal usage of the term, to transfer something or 
someone is to convey, remove, or hand them over to a new place or position. To be 
transferred is literally to leave place or position A and go to place or position B. So 
property, say, is transferred (conveyed) from a previous owner to a new owner. A 
footballer is transferred from one football club to another. But in this sense it is clearly 
untrue that to teach skills is to transfer them. Teachers do not literally transfer their skills 
to learners. Rather, as a result of successful teaching, a new instance of the skill is 
created, seemingly in the learner's body. But the teacher still retains the skill that has been 
supposedly ‘transferred’ to the learner. So this is definitely not transfer in the usual sense. 
The metaphor misleads us.  
 
An apparently simpler case is transfer of skills from place to place. We learn (say) ‘x’ in 
location ‘y’. We then take it to location ‘z’ and use it (transfer it). But once again this is 
an odd usage of ‘transfer’. Surely when we use the learnt skill it is more accurate to say 
that we apply it to the new situation. If we literally transferred it, we would leave it 
behind when we left the new situation. It is closer to the facts to say that it is persons 
having skills who transfer from place to place rather the skills themselves transferring. 
Once again, the metaphor can easily mislead us. 
 
Educational arguments against the acquisition and transfer metaphors 
 
Not surprisingly, given these limitations of the acquisition and transfer metaphors in 
common speech, they also run into problems when the educational issues they cover are 
considered more closely. Consider first the acquisition metaphor. A link has already been 
noted between the ‘common-sense’ story about learning and the perception that 
successful performance on a quiz show is a good measure of learning (acquisition). 
However, it does not take much thought to realise that the quiz show view of learning is a 
very limited and partial one. Consider, for example, a discipline such as chemistry, which 
is replete with factual propositional knowledge. There are literally millions of chemical 
compounds each with their own formula, colour, boiling point, melting point, freezing 
point, etc. These millions of chemical compounds fall into a huge number of classes, each 
with distinctive properties and types of reactions they take part in. Now suppose that 
someone became a quiz show champion by unfailingly answering correctly whatever 
factual questions on chemistry were asked of them, no matter how difficult or obscure the 
questions might be. Would we describe that person as an expert chemist? At the very 
least we would have some doubts about the kind of person who would furnish their mind 
with such minutiae. Expert chemists certainly do not fill their minds with this multiplicity 
of facts. Rather, they know what factual information may be useful in a given situation, 
where and how to access this information as needed, how to use it in suitable situations, 
etc. So their understanding (not acquisition) of the immensity of chemical knowledge is 
contingent on a range of know how that is not itself purely chemical nor codifiable as a 
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series of true propositions. For this reason, expert chemists might not perform as well as 
expected in a quiz show on the subject area ‘chemistry’, especially if the questions were 
pitched at a level significantly beyond the elementary. 
 
If the knowledge of an expert chemist does not conform very well to the quiz show ideal, 
this is even more so for experts in more applied fields of practice. Consider an artistic 
example. Imagine a quiz show champion whose special subject was ‘Verdi operas’. This 
person has an encyclopaedic knowledge of plot and scene details, names of characters, 
details of first performances, singers who performed particular roles, etc. But was this 
person really an expert on Verdi operas? From the evidence of the knowledge displayed 
on the quiz show we cannot really tell whether this person appreciates and is moved by 
performances of Verdi operas. Certainly specialists on performance of Verdi operas have 
quite other learning and knowledge than that required by the quiz show. Whereas the quiz 
show can only deal with questions where there is an indisputably correct answer, the 
practice of performance of Verdi operas is one in which important matters are very much 
open to interpretation and contestation. Different opera directors will have varying 
interpretations and approaches to performance of Verdi operas. Questions like ‘who were 
the three greatest Verdi tenors?’ do not have clear-cut answers precisely because different 
people have different background assumptions, beliefs and experiences which reflect 
their responses to such questions. In a word, the ‘contexts’, which have shaped their 
approaches to such questions, differ markedly. 
 
There are also some very powerful educational arguments that challenge the value of the 
transfer metaphor. For a start identifying genuine cases of learning transfer has proved to 
be surprisingly elusive. Despite increasing power of experimental techniques, transfer 
“seems to vanish when experimenters try to pin it down” (Schoenfeld 1999, p. 7). In a 
recent major study of transfer, Haskell (2001) states the following: 
 
Transfer of learning … is the very foundation of learning, thinking and problem 
solving (p. xiii). 
 
Yet later, on the same page, Haskell also observes that: 
 
Despite the importance of transfer of learning, research findings over the past nine 
decades clearly show that as individuals, and as educational institutions, we have 
failed to achieve transfer of learning at any significant level (p xiii). 
 
If both these statements were true, it would follow that humankind was still largely 
incapable of learning, thinking or problem solving. Yet our everyday experiences and the 
history of human progress suggest the opposite is true. Something is clearly wrong here. 
Yet Haskell accepts this contradictory situation and retains his faith in the vital 
importance of transfer. This illustrates the ongoing power of this idea to shape thinking 
about education policy at all levels. However, given these empirical findings about 
transfer, others have accepted that there is a need to reconceptualise transfer and, by 
implication, learning. For instance, Bransford & Schwartz (1999) propose that we 
broaden the notion of ‘transfer’ by including an emphasis on ‘preparation for future 
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learning’, the ability to learn in new environments. Others, myself included, see the moral 
of the contradiction noted by Haskell as being the urgent need to develop new 
understandings of learning. This includes the deployment of new metaphors, since I 
accept that humans are unable to think about learning in non-metaphorical ways. 
 
Alternative approaches to understanding learning 
 
In the last twenty or so years, a range of theorising about learning has sought to take 
account of its social and situated character. This theorising has also deliberately 
encompassed learning outside of formal education settings. The diversity of both this 
theorising and the cases of learning that it encompasses, suggest that there may be no 
such thing as a single general account of learning. Also, that there may be many 
inherently different kinds of learning. As a result of this work, it seems plausible to view 
learning as a conceptual and linguistic construction, one that is widely used in many 
societies and cultures, but with very different meanings, which are at least partly 
contradictory and contested. Put differently, there is no external, reified entity that is 
‘learning’. Rather, people construct and label certain processes/activities/products as 
‘learning’ (Saljö 2003). In these theories, the ideas that ‘learning is a reified thing’ and 
‘individuals are the main or only locations of learning’ are both rejected. These newer 
learning theories include situated learning, socio-cultural activity theory, cognitive 
apprenticeship, and more. Here I will not attempt a separate account of each category of 
theory, as that is a lengthy and complex task (see Hager 2005b for a critical overview of 
these theories as they relate to understanding learning at work). Rather, I will discuss the 
various alternative metaphors that are employed by these newer theories and how our 
understanding of learning is creatively changed by these alternative metaphors. The 
metaphors that are invoked by these newer learning theories tend to be employed across 
theories, rather than a particular metaphor being distinctly associated with just one 
theory. The main metaphors, which I will be discussing here are: participation, 
construction/re-construction (or transformation), and becoming. 
 
The participation metaphor 
 
The metaphor of learning through participation in human practices was popularised 
through the seminal work of Lave and Wenger (1991). Their proposal that learning arises 
from learners participating in communities of practice is also referred to as situated 
learning, since, contra the ‘common-sense’ view of learning, it maintains that learning is 
highly contextual. On this approach, learning, both as a process and as a product, is 
inseparable from the socio-cultural setting in which it occurs. Subsequently, the 
participation metaphor has become widely-used, even by theorists whose ideas in other 
respects part company with Lave and Wenger. Thus participation is now a dominant 
metaphor in diverse writings about learning. Subsidiary metaphors found in these 
writings include learning as activity and, for learning by beginners, ideas such as ‘finding 
your way around’ the field of practice and terms that denote either level of attainment 
(e.g. ‘second year apprentice’, ‘journeyman’) or level of acceptance within the 




The participation and related metaphors lead to a very different understanding of learning 
from that captured via the metaphors of the ‘common-sense’ account. What is learnt 
becomes a complex social construction that subsumes the individual learner. So, rather 
than the thing or substance of the ‘common-sense’ view, on this account what is learnt is 
a complex entity extending well beyond the learner; it is a set of more or less complex 
practices; a social construction undergoing continuous change. The learner is claimed to 
learn by active participation in social practices and is thought of as gradually being 
subsumed into the complex social construction that is an evolving set of practices. Here 
learning is not seen as independent from the learner in the particular ways that it was for 
the ‘common-sense’ view. However, the practices themselves will have a history that is 
not dependent on the participation of any given learner. Not only is learning on this 
account not located fully within the learner, but communities of practice feature the 
possibility, indeed the likelihood, of communal learning, i.e. learning by teams and 
organisations that is not simply reducible to individual learning (Toulmin 1999). 
 
Learning for newcomers involves movement of the learner from insignificance to greater 
prominence as they engage in the practice to be learnt. Whereas the ‘common-sense’ 
view posited movement of what was learnt, the participation metaphor suggests 
movement by the learner rather than by what is learnt. The practice is normally 
something that is ‘there’ well before learners start to engage in it. Learners move within 
the practice from novices to, mostly, proficient performers; from legitimate peripheral to 
full participation. However, within theories that employ the participation metaphor, the 
learning of newcomers is not always the prime focus. Wenger (1998), for example, came 
to see legitimate peripheral participation as a special case. After all, experienced 
practitioners also need to learn from their ongoing participation in evolving practices. 
 
The participation metaphor portrays learning as inherently contextual, thus directly 
challenging the value of the acquisition and transfer metaphors. Acceptance of the idea 
that learning has contextual features entails the likelihood of the learner modifying and 
adapting earlier learning to handle a related situation in a new context. This is a normal 
occurrence in all kinds of human practices. It is also a much more complex situation than 
the ‘acquire it and transfer it’ model takes it to be. This contextualisation of learning 
contrasts sharply with the ‘common-sense’ view that learning transcends context. 
Moreover, for the participation metaphor, learning (and the learner) continue to change as 
contexts change. This is why the participation metaphor highlights the ongoing learning 
of experienced practitioners, rather than just that of novices, as in the early work of Lave 
and Wenger. Overall, this makes learning a more complex phenomenon than the 
‘common-sense’ view would have it. As already indicated, both learning by individuals 
and learning by teams or groups are compatible with the participation metaphor. 
 
Limitations of the participation metaphor 
 
The participation metaphor has been charged with embedding the learning so completely 
within the given context that it is remains a mystery exactly how individuals are reshaped 
(another metaphor) by their learning. It has been argued that participation theories are 
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silent about the individual’s learning as their personal identity changes from a novice to a 
full participant (see, e.g., Elkjaer 2003, Guile & Young 1999). In integrating the 
individual learner into a social participatory process, the sense of the individual life 
history, dispositions and agency of each learner is lost (Billett 2001; Hodkinson & 
Hodkinson 2004b). 
 
Another problem is that much theorising that employs the participation metaphor 
concentrates upon a single context for learning. Most research studies focus on learning 
within one workplace. The more the focus switches to the learning of experienced 
workers, the greater is the tendency to bracket off what happened in previous locations, 
or what might happen in future ones. The participation metaphor has relatively little to 
say about the effect of previous learning on current learning, or of past or present learning 
on future learning. 
 
By emphasising the role of contextuality, the participation metaphor challenges the 
‘common-sense’ view’s assumptions about uniformity in what is to be learnt. Rather than 
thinking of learning for a designated practice as a standard list of items to be acquired by 
all would-be practitioners, a person’s practice is better viewed as participation in a 
continually evolving process. The constant appearance of novel situations, new kinds of 
equipment, local traditions or preferences, etc., mean that learning needed for successful 
practice is continuous and not specifiable in advance. Proficiency in a particular area of 
practice, may not easily translate to proficiency in neighbouring areas of practice. In 
circumstances such as these, where learning (participation) is a continually evolving 
process, transfer and acquisition no longer appeal as general explanatory concepts. 
 
I maintain that all human learning entails participation in a social context, even if that 
context is a desert island, or preparing for a quiz show. However, this is not the same as 
claiming that the participation metaphor alone can adequately explain all learning. More 
specifically, it cannot offer a complete explanation of all learning for all purposes. 
(Although Sfard (1998) thinks, controversially, that between them acquisition and 
participation can do the full job). 
 
 
The construction/re-construction (or transformation) metaphors 
 
This group of metaphors involves the re-construction or transformation of either the 
learner(s) or of the learner(s) together with their environment. This results in at least two 
variations within this kind of theorising. Firstly, there is the intellectual movement 
sometimes termed simply constructivism. Here the emphasis is firmly on transformation 
or reconstruction within the individual learner. Perhaps because of the impact of 
constructivism within the fields of mathematics and science education, there is often a 
concentration on propositional knowledge. According to this particular variety of 
constructivism, learning science, say, entails the transformation and reconstruction of 
what is already known by the learner. Thus, Chinn and Brewer (1993) write about the 
ways in which pre-existing schemata can inhibit the understanding of science. Subsidiary 
metaphors prominent in this variant of constructivism include ‘scaffolding’ – the notion 
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that new learning is built on existing understanding, as bricks are added to an existing 
wall. The learner is transformed into a scientist, as a wall is transformed into a building. 
This metaphor suggests that what is learned is changing continually, as each learner 
constructs/re-constructs their own evolving understanding of it. In this respect it is similar 
to the learning through participation metaphor. However, this version of constructivism 
differs from the participation approach in that it downplays the significance of context for 
learning. In this variation of construction/re-construction, the individual changes while 
the context remains the same. Put differently, there is an acknowledged influence of 
context on learning, but not vice versa. But even within individual constructivism, there 
are more or less radical versions. More radical versions portray what is learned as 
differing across individuals, as each learner constructs their own unique understanding of 
science. In less radical versions, much important knowledge, such as the content of 
science, remains relatively unchanged (Phillips 1995). The issue then is simply how 
individual students can be assisted to construct the same, i.e. the correct, understanding. 
 
A second major variant of learning viewed as construction/re-construction (or 
transformation) shifts attention to holistic learning systems, i.e learner(s) together with 
the environment become the unit of analysis. A key idea for these versions of the 
metaphor is that “collective entities can learn” (Salomon & Perkins 1998, p. 10). 
Salomon and Perkins suggest that this kind of learning has been relatively neglected 
because it is not prominent in formal education settings. However, they maintain, not 
only does “a great deal of individual learning and education” occur outside of formal 
education arrangements, but that a lot of it is group learning. These versions of the 
construction/re-construction (or transformation) metaphors are to be found in 
Engestrom’s (2001) version of socio-cultural activity theory. The focus here is on the 
activity system as a whole – it is the system that changes, usually as a result of either 
internal or external contradictions or pressures. The context in which individual learners 
work and learn is regarded as changing, and they in turn change with it. However, the 
emphasis is mainly on the impact that a changing context has on individual learners, 
rather than the other way around. 
 
Fundamental assumptions underpinning this approach to understanding learning and its 
associated metaphors are: 
 
1. Learning, is a complex relational web that transcends the individual learner.  
2. Learning is an evolving process that includes the learner evolving. 
3. Learning involves emergence of novelty as new understandings and/or new contexts 
are formed. 
 
A limitation is that very little of the literature adopting this approach addresses both 
individual change and the changing context. Learning is viewed as a relational complex 
with individual interpretations still possible. But group learning emerges as a major kind 
of learning on this approach. 
 
The becoming metaphor 
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This metaphor puts the individual learner back into the frame. But the person is not 
viewed as a ‘vessel’ containing ‘stuff’, to use Bereiter’s (2002) folk theory terminology. 
Rather, we have a person whose social and embodied self includes skills, knowledge and 
understanding. These can be understood as integral parts of the person. Each person has 
constructed that skill or knowledge as part of themselves. Here learning is viewed as a 
relational web, a process of ongoing change. It connects the learner to the surrounding 
world in an evolving way. Learning is transactional in that it changes both the learner and 
the context, viewed both widely and narrowly. Most generally, learning is a change in 
both the learner and its environment. It follows that when a person joins a new workplace 
they bring within themselves much more than skills or knowledge. Rather, they bring 
experience. 
 
In common with the two previous metaphor groups, this view rejects basic assumptions 
of the ‘common-sense’ story of learning. It replaces them as follows: 
i. Far from being a thing or substance, learning is a changing relational web.  
ii. Nor is learning independent of the learner, since the learner is a part of this 
changing relational web. 
iii. Rather than involving movement of a thing or substance from place to place, 
learning consists of a relational web in a process of ongoing change. 
iv. Rather than what is learnt being separate from and independent of the context in 
which it is learnt, learning is inherently part of and shaped by its context. 
 
What has been presented so far, in the last two paragraphs, has much in common with the 
ideas characterising the two previous metaphor groups. This reflects the fact that the 
‘becoming’ metaphor is a recently emerging one in which writers have sought to redress 
some of the perceived limitations of the participation and construction/re-construction 
metaphors. The metaphor of learning as becoming presents us with a holistic way of 
understanding learning as a process. This involves viewing learning as social and 
embodied (practical, physical and emotional, as well as cognitive). So, when a learner 
constructs or reconstructs knowledge or skills, they are also reconstructing themselves. 
This personal reconstruction should not be thought of in merely individual terms. It is 
crucial to fully recognise the social and embodied nature of that reconstruction. Such 
personal reconstruction is sometimes explicit and agentic, but much of it is tacit from the 
perspective of the person concerned (see Beckett & Hager 2002; Hager & Halliday 
2006). That is, people become through learning and learn through becoming whether they 
wish to do so or not, and whether they are aware of the process or not. So the metaphor of 
becoming adds extra dimensions to our understanding, providing a richness that the two 
previous metaphor groups lacked. 
 
Using the metaphor of becoming to understand learning does not entail a fixed state of 
having become. Put differently, there is not always a clear endpoint to learning, though 
sometimes, of course, either the learner or others may be explicitly concerned with one. 
Employers are often concerned with how well and, increasingly, how quickly a new 
worker becomes fully functional within their working practices. Similarly, students are 
directly concerned to become a teacher, social worker, chef, shop worker or engineer. 
However, such end points are simplifications and also are somewhat arbitrary stages in 
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the on-going learning process. It is well known that fully trained ‘full members’ of a 
workplace culture continue to learn (see Hodkinson & Hodkinson 2004a, 2004b, for one 
example). The metaphor of becoming captures this sense that learning is never complete. 
As Saljö (2003, p. 315) argues “people simply cannot avoid learning”. Learning as 
becoming ends with death, or with a permanently comatose state. It is for this reason that 
it is difficult to identify when learning to be, say, a medical practitioner starts or ends. It 
often starts well before any formal educational training, and ends well after the first 
appointment to an internship. 
 
What has been said so far about learning as becoming can be read exclusively in terms of 
the learning by individuals. This metaphor is certainly very useful for thinking about 
learning by individuals, but that should not obscure the vital importance of group 
learning. The idea of group learning, with no clear endpoint to the learning, is a powerful 
one for understanding the practices that obtain in many contemporary work and other 
situations. My own recent research has identified many clear instances where the concept 
of learning by groups is essential for any cogent understanding of what was taking place 
in particular work sites. In these cases, learning by individuals was but a part of the story. 
This research has included studies of young players being mentored into the role of 
‘professional orchestral musician’(Johnson & Hager 2006) and novice chefs being 
inducted into the practices of high performance kitchens (Johnson & Hager 2007). In 
both of these cases, the individuals concerned underwent some rich and rapid personal 
learning. But in addition, it was equally clear that what was occurring in these high 
performance work activities was major learning by the group or sub-groups (the orchestra 
as a whole, particular sub-sections of the orchestra) or teams (kitchen team) with no clear 
endpoint to the learning. It was notable that in both of these cases it was well-known to 
those organising and running the sites of practice that mere assessment of individual 
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